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The	roots	of	Brexit	lie	in	Britain’s	broken	economic
model:	we	now	urgently	need	a	new	social	settlement
The	roots	of	Brexit	lie	in	Britain’s	broken	growth	model.	This	was	acknowledged	in	the	immediate
aftermath	of	the	2016	vote	but	British	negotiators	have	since	acted	as	if	the	only	goal	in	their
dealings	with	the	EU	is	to	preserve	the	status	quo.	Chris	Bickerton	(Cambridge)	argues	that
Britain’s	consumption-driven	growth	model	needs	to	change	and	whilst	Brexit	is	not	a	sufficient
condition	for	this	change,	it	is	probably	a	necessary	condition	for	it.	This	is	most	visible	in	the	way
that	the	EU’s	rules	of	free	movement	have	interacted	with	the	UK’s	open	and	flexible	labour
market.	This	blog	is	based	on	a	longer	essay	written	for	the	think	tank	Policy	Exchange.
At	the	time	of	the	referendum	result	in	June	2016,	many	prominent	figures	spoke	about	how	this	surprise	outcome
was	proof	that	something	fundamental	had	gone	wrong	in	the	British	economy	and	the	social	contract	that	went	with
it.	In	her	first	speech	as	Prime	Minister,	Theresa	May	promised	that	Brexit	would	give	those	who	are	“just	about
managing”	more	control	over	their	lives.	Since	then,	the	connection	has	been	lost.	The	UK	government’s	negotiations
with	the	EU	lack	any	positive	economic	strategy.	We	are	left	with	the	impression	that	the	government	feels	it	is
caught	between	a	rock	and	a	hard	place,	between	economic	disaster	and	English	nationalism,	and	that	all	we	should
be	aiming	for	is	to	preserve	the	status	quo	as	much	as	possible.
But	the	2016	vote	told	us	that	the	status	quo	is	not	working	for	many	people.	The	UK	economy	faces	grave	problems.
We	have	historically	low	productivity	growth,	low	wage	growth,	and	a	broken	housing	market	where	there	is	no
connection	any	longer	between	average	earnings	and	house	prices.	Regional	disparities	are	so	great	that	it	is	difficult
to	think	of	the	UK	as	having	anything	like	a	“national	economy”.
The	UK’s	negotiations	with	the	EU	should	be	based	on	an	economic	strategy	geared	towards	addressing	 these
problems.	The	goal	should	be	to	change	the	British	economy,	not	to	preserve	the	status	quo	as	much	as	possible.
The	problems	of	the	British	economy	were	not	offset	by	EU	membership	and	indeed,	membership	aggravated	some
of	them.	This	should	give	pause	for	thought	for	those	who	argue	that	they	can	be	solved	by	giving	up	on	Brexit
altogether.
Where	might	a	positive	strategy	come	from?	First	of	all,	we	need	a	certain	idea	and	framework	for	thinking	about	the
British	economy.	There	are	many	different	sorts	of	frameworks,	each	relying	on	a	certain	conception	of	the	macro-
economy.	Looking	at	GDP	by	expenditure,	we	can	see	that	in	the	UK	household	spending	is	dominant,	far	more	than
business	investment	or	net	exports.	Growth	in	consumption	was	most	noticeable	in	the	1990s,	where	it	expanded	at
the	expense	of	government	spending.	Then	the	relationship	between	consumption	and	government	spending
stabilized	in	the	2000s.	Colin	Crouch	called	this	privatized	Keynesianism:	a	system	of	demand-driven	growth	where
the	main	driver	is	household	spending,	not	government	spending.	Financial	deregulation	has	entrenched	this
consumption-driven	growth	model,	as	has	the	role	of	rising	house	prices	in	financing	new	rounds	of	consumption	by
homeowners.
This	model	has	shaped	the	UK	labour	market	–	a	sign	of	how	sustained	patterns	in	aggregate	demand	can	reshape
the	supply	side	of	the	economy.	We	have	seen	a	hollowing	out	of	the	labour	market,	with	the	expansion	in	low	and
unskilled	work	and	that	of	high	skilled	work,	but	with	the	erosion	of	middle	skill	levels.	Some	of	this	is	due	to
technological	change	but	some	of	it	is	endogenous	to	a	growth	model	that	sustains	high	demand	for	low	skilled
service	sector	employment.	After	the	economic	crisis	of	2008,	the	door	on	new	entrants	to	this	model	was	shut	by
making	it	more	difficult	to	borrow	to	finance	house	purchases.	But	house	prices	remain	far	in	excess	of	average
earnings.	The	result	has	been	10	years	of	simmering	inter-generational	warfare	between	the	baby	boomers	and	the
millennials,	exacerbated	by	very	poor	wage	growth	and	an	increasingly	dualized	labour	market.	This	is	the	broken
British	growth	model	that	provided	the	context	for	the	Brexit	vote	2	years	ago.
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Why	has	EU	free	movement	been	so	much	of	an	issue	in	the	UK?	There	is	a	definite	puzzle	here.
EU	free	movement	was	a	major	factor	behind	the	vote.	But	many	studies	conclude	that	there	was	no	obvious
downward	pressure	on	wages	due	to	EU	immigration	into	the	UK.	How	to	reconcile	these	two	findings?	Many	have
concluded	that	the	British	working	class	is	xenophobic	and	that	the	Brexit	vote	had	a	powerful	nativist	character	to	it.
This	is	unconvincing.	The	country	does	not	have	a	solid	radical	right	component	to	its	politics	–	nothing	like	the	Front
National	in	France,	the	Lega	in	Italy	or	even	now	the	AFD	in	Germany.
One	reason	that	EU	free	movement	has	been	a	problem	in	the	UK	is	that	it	has	exacerbated	the	structural
imbalances	and	distributional	inequalities	of	our	consumption-driven	growth	model.	One	of	the	transmission
mechanisms	between	free	movement	and	bad	outcomes	for	many	people	in	the	UK	is	through	the	impact	upon
training	and	skill	formation.	To	be	clear,	the	UK’s	poor	record	on	training	is	not	caused	by	EU	free	movement.	It	is
caused	by	the	fundamental	difficulty	capitalist	economies	have	of	providing	collective	goods	in	the	absence	of	direct
state	provision.	Skill	formation	is	such	a	collective	good:	the	costs	are	to	the	employer	but	gains	are	quickly
socialized	as	a	worker	moves	jobs.	As	a	result,	economies	based	on	wage	labour	will	systematically	under-invest	in
skills.
EU	free	movement	of	labour	rules	have	provided	employers	in	the	UK	with	a	way	of	escaping	the	financial	burden
and	risk	of	investing	in	skills.	Without	institutional	remedies	of	the	sort	that	exist	in	more	regulated	and
institutionalized	labour	markets,	the	impact	on	training	is	severe.	The	latest	official	figures	for	apprenticeships	makes
for	grim	reading:	a	31%	drop	in	the	number	of	people	in	in-work	training	schemes	between	last	August	and	May	of
this	year.	On	the	very	same	day,	newspapers	were	reporting	that	universities	were	unable	to	fill	their	places.
Another	transmission	mechanism	is	the	factor	mix.	High	levels	of	net	migration	into	the	EU	have	encouraged
businesses	to	pursue	labour-rich	extensive	growth	strategies.	Employing	more	people	is	one	way	to	gain	a
competitive	edge,	especially	in	some	service	sectors,	but	over	time	its	drags	down	productivity	as	firms	invest	less	in
new	technology	and	in	the	training	required	to	enable	existing	employees	to	get	the	best	out	of	this	technology.
There	are	some	small	signs	that	a	tightening	labour	market	is	beginning	to	stimulate	a	move	to	intensive	growth
strategies,	which	would	mean	more	capital	investment,	but	UK	productivity	growth	is	as	flat	as	ever.
So	where	do	we	go	from	here?	The	British	growth	model	needs	to	be	reformed	in	three	different	ways .
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We	should	move	our	economy	away	from	extensive	growth	to	intensive	growth	strategies.	This	means	rebalancing
growth	away	from	reliance	upon	household	spending,	and	towards	business	investment	and	net	exports.	Some	of
this	requires	a	change	in	the	macroeconomic	framework.	There	is	a	place	for	a	depreciated	Pound,	though	a	weaker
Pound	on	its	own	will	not	rebalance	the	UK	economy	at	all.	We	also	need	an	industrial	policy	that	focuses	not	just	on
hi-tech	innovation	hubs	but	on	building	more	domestic	supply	chains	so	that	gains	from	a	weaker	currency	would	not
all	be	lost	through	the	rising	prices	of	components.	Capital	controls	can	ease	the	burden	of	a	strong	Pound	and	can
help	rebalancing	towards	productive	investment	by	making	it	more	difficult	to	rely	on	the	UK	as	a	magnet	for
international	capital	flows.
We	also	need	to	focus	on	skills	and	training	in	new	ways.	We	should	introduce	a	statutory	obligation	to	train	for
employers.	We	should	create	an	Institute	of	Work,	whose	purpose	is	to	investigate	the	complex	relationship	between
skills,	labour	markets,	and	productivity.	We	should	create	a	Royal	College	of	Child	and	Adult	Care,	on	the	model	of
the	Royal	College	of	Nursing,	to	improve	the	skill	level	and	status	of	these	critical	but	undervalued	professions.
We	need	to	move	away	from	our	asset-based	society,	where	wealth	accrues	through	the	ownership	of	assets	rather
than	through	wage	income.
This	will	involve	weaning	the	economy	off	its	reliance	upon	the	wealth	effects	of	rising	house	prices.	Some	of	this	can
come	from	building	more	houses	but	we	also	need	to	change	the	wider	financial	framework	which	has	encouraged
the	transformation	of	houses	from	places	where	we	live	into	assets	and	investment	vehicles.
Finally,	and	most	importantly,	we	need	to	find	a	new	social	settlement	for	the	UK,	one	that	is	national	in	character
and	that	can	create	new	ties	between	individuals,	the	market	and	the	state.	A	key	legacy	of	Thatcherism	was	that
institutions	of	this	kind	are	seen	as	no	more	than	selfish	rent-seekers.	In	fact,	without	a	social	settlement,	it	is
impossible	for	capitalist	societies	to	overcome	the	problem	of	collective	goods	provision.	We	should	not	try	to
reinvent	the	old	corporatism	of	the	post-1945	era	because	this	kind	of	industrial	relations	will	not	map	onto	21st-
century	British	society.	But	a	new	social	settlement	is	needed	urgently.
Any	program	for	change	is	likely	to	create	huge	amounts	of	resistance.	It	would	terribly	naïve	to	think	that	you	can
change	the	British	economy	without	coming	up	against	the	power	of	entrenched	interests.	Faced	with	these	interests,
we	need	to	build	a	political	majority	in	favour	of	a	rebalanced	British	growth	model.	If	we	do	not	do	this,	then
particular	interests	will	always	win	out	against	the	common	good.	Brexit	is	not	a	sufficient	condition	for	this	kind	of
change,	far	from	it.	But	it	is	probably	a	necessary	condition	given	the	way	EU	membership	has	interacted	with	and
shaped	the	British	growth	model.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	LSE	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	It	is	based	on
a	longer	essay	written	for	the	think	tank	Policy	Exchange.
Chris	Bickerton	is	a	Reader	in	politics	at	POLIS	and	an	Official	Fellow	at	Queens’	College,	Cambridge,	as	well	as
author	of	The	European	Union:	A	Citizen’s	Guide.
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